When Peace Falters: The Trials and Limits of Gandhi’s 1920-22 Satyagraha

When Peace Falters: The Trials and Limits of Gandhi’s 1920-22 Satyagraha

Based on its details and tone, Source 1 is extremely credible for a historian to deeply investigate the effectiveness of the non-violence methods advocated by Gandhi in the 1920-22 satyagraha as it shows how a display of overconfidence and lack of direction for the aftermath of a supposed success led to the movement’s collapse. The Viceroy clearly writes how Gandhi’s attachment to satyagraha was so strong that he believed non-violence was “the most powerful weapon for ordinary people against the Government of India.” which evidently infers that Gandhi had led the event with the belief that it was always going to succeed, therefore conveying the methods’ ineffectiveness as this mindset never allowed Gandhi to consider the consequences for any potential failure of the event. To back this up with knowledge, when the Prince of Wales visited Bombay, what Gandhi expected to be a committed non-violent protest turned into a horrific event of rioting and looting, leaving 53 dead and hundreds injured, completely going against the principles of satyagraha and Gandhi left vulnerable to think of suitable alternatives, presenting how ineffective his pledge for satyagraha turned out to be. However, although it may have had severe effects on Gandhi’s planning, the violence could have happened due to a lack of moral discipline rather than full intention, despite such a fact still not detaching away from the truth that the violence itself, intentional or non-intentional, left the methods appearing to Reading as ineffective. the Viceroy clearly states how even if the event succeeded, Gandhi “never seemed to have [had] a practical plan for government” which is significant in conveying how ineffective his methods were since the evident struggles and desires for the many differing views in governance in India meant that it was extremely difficult to please everyone around him using satyagraha or non-violent methods and principles, since some people were more radical than others, furthermore damaging his title as the self-proclaimed “voice of all India.” This is backed up from my own knowledge when Gandhi decided to accept arrest when put on trial for civil disobedience, it had caused a sharp split amongst the India community, with some believing he made a cowardly move in choosing to accept the British punishment seeing satyagraha to be a catalyst for fear whilst others saw it as the necessary move to avoid escalating tensions. Moreover, the Viceroy had made a particular note of how after the campaign had ended, many of his devotees started to think about if Gandhi would “achieve anything beyond agitation and disturbance.” which prominently displayed the source’s claim of the ineffectiveness of his methods as the events of the campaign ended up reverting the actual intentions of satyagraha, turning it from a belief of peace into a causation of destruction. This is supported by the Chauri Chuara incident which started out normally taking satyagraha into effect until police beat protestors, leading to mass uproar, the death of 23 policemen and the burning of a police station. Furthermore, the provenance of this source gives it a massive historical weight that must be taken into account as well as limitations that makes the source cautious to handle. As a letter written 3 months after the Chauri Chaura indicent took place, the recollection of the exact damage Gandhi’s methods caused is extremely vivid, making its ineffectiveness appear more believable. However, it was written by the Viceroy and although he is of great power, he is still just one man and his view alone might not be entirely representative of the public opinion on the effectiveness of Gandhi’s methods, which slightly debases the source’s historical value. Therefore, Source 1 provides a valuable insight for a historian to investigate the effectiveness of Gandhi’s methods as the faith Gandhi put into his methods to the point of such blinding him from potential failure or future governance caused his methods to poison him into failing entirely and rendering his methods ineffective.

On the other hand, Source 2 is also highly credible for a historian to make an investigation into the effectiveness of Gandhi’s methods in the 1920-22 satyagraha as it showed how his faith towards satyagraha as well as his lack of enunciation to define what exactly satyagraha consisted of caused the methods to fail. Almost immediately, Nehru writes about how “the events at Chauri Chaura, and its consequences, made [them] examine the implications of non-violence as a tactic” which implies that Gandhi saw his methods of satyagraha as essential for any and all movements, seeing it as an obligation rather than a potential, This is backed up from my own knowledge that the Young Hooligans’ dismissal of non-violence as a strategy was the one reason Gandhi condemned them despite them and him fighting for the betterment of India, suggesting that the different weight each of them placed on satyagraha played a role in causing a social morale regression, as some Indians believed that the need for satyagraha was unnecessary whilst others believed it essential for the progression of India’s future. On top of this, Nehru switches the tone of his account into one of curiosity, leading him to ask the question of what about satyagraha caused Gandhi to fail “the non-violent method itself or of Gandhi’s interpretation of it?” suggesting that Gandhi never actually specified hat satyagraha actually consisted of, leading many to believe it to be too broad and speculative to understand beyond the fact it’s non-violent, leading to the perceived ineffectiveness of Gandhi’s methods due to the lack of understanding of the belief he followed. This supported my own knowledge of Gandhi’s original plan for the movement consisting of removing children from government-led schools, protests and Congress Boycotts which are certain aspects satyagraha was, but never fully explained what it actually meant, often having led to misunderstandings of the term satyagraha. Moreover, Nehru voiced his disapproval in the source regarding the premature end of the campaign stating that it “contributed to a tragic development in the country” suggesting that the aggression was much needed to be released in order to convey India’s voice and it presents Gandhi’s methods to be ineffective as it has been shown only to suppress the public anger without allowing them to express it as seen with the aftermath of Chauri Chaura. Based on knowledge, after Gandhi decided to call off the movement after the 1922 Chauri Chaura incident, it had shocked several younger, more radical-thinking Indians as they saw no reason to end a wide nationalist movement over an incident, showing a generational split determined by moral purity and national progression. The source’s provenance also credits its historical value. Since the source examined in question is an autobiography, it meant that the author was able to recapture his exact moments witnessing the event and making his reflections seem more visible since the author Nehru was one of the Young Hooligans and an attender of the Movement, making his recount more believable. However, the source was written in 1936, which may make the recollection of the event slightly hazier, having occurred 14 years ago. Therefore, Source 2 provides a valuable historical insight and investigation into the effectiveness of Gandhi’s methods in the 1920-22 satyagraha as it showed how Gandhi’s lack of explanation into how exactly satyagraha functioned led to public confusion and unrest, causing the entire 1920-22 satyagraha to fail.

When in combination, both Sources 1 and 2 are extremely useful for the average historian to investigate into the effectiveness of Gandhi’s methods during the 1920-22 Non-Cooperation Campaign as they provide the same argument but give completely different explanations as to why they stated their argument. Both sources have high historical value and argue that ultimately, Gandhi’s non-violent methods were ineffective during the 1920-22 satyagraha but while Reading argued it was due to Gandhi’s overconfidence in his thinking and planning and a lack of decision of how to carry out governance for the future if the plan succeeded, Nehru argued it was due to Gandhi’s lack of definition as to what satyagraha exactly was causing the public to have no true understanding of the term. Surprisingly however, one point both sources do make is that Gandhi had immensely relied on satyagraha and saw his method as the only definitive proof of India progressing for a better future, only in different ways of showing how, where Reading does it explicitly directly saying how Gandhi saw it as the greatest weapon India has as Nehru does it more implicitly, never mentioning it but implying how reliant he was through his ambitions towards the violence being necessary to release suppressed aggression and believing it to be nothing more than a tactic. Their differing tones also provide us massive details as to how ineffective the methods of Gandhi truly were. Source 1’s tone is highly disproving, as well as having slight hints of sarcasm, which suggested that the movement had caused Gandhi’s representation of satyagraha to shift and transform into something with negative connotations, suggesting that his actions caused his belief to become they very thing he wanted it to never become. On the other hand, Source 2’s tone is far more on the side of both curiosity and confusion, as well as slightly irritable, suggesting that Gandhi’s logic had perplexed some Indians since it contradicts how he normally lives his saint-like life in comparison to a politician, something he very clearly wasn’t. Furthermore, the differing provenances of the sources makes it further useful as well. Source 1 was written 3 months after Chauri Chaura by the Viceroy at the time whilst Source 2 was written by a leading Congress member and Young Hooligan in an autobiography, suggesting that despite being on entirely different sides and having different moralistic viewpoints in regards to the governance of India, both ultimately still saw Gandhi’s attempt as a massive failure, showing indifference. Furthermore, while Source 1 is a private letter and Source 2 is an autobiography, one thing that both natures of the source have in common is that both are primary sources detailing clear, almost eyewitness recollections of the events, allowing them to be more vividly interpreted and easily believed, suggesting how their reflections ultimately reflected. Therefore, both Sources 1 and 2 together are extremely useful for this investigation as they both seem to hold different weights to contributing factors leading to the ultimate downfall of the satyagraha whilst still holding the same opinion despite differing provenances.