I recently attended a lecture at the London School of Economics by Dr Alex Wellerstein, titled “The Most Awful Responsibility: Truman and the Secret Struggle for Control of the Atomic Age.” The lecture explored a question that immediately stood out to me: how can Harry S. Truman be remembered as both the president who oversaw the use of the atomic bomb and, at the same time, arguably one of the most anti-nuclear leaders of the twentieth century?
Initial Impressions: The Moral Weight of the Bomb
One of the most striking ideas presented was Truman’s own reflection on the atomic bomb. It was described as the most terrible of all destructive forces for the wholesale slaughter of human beings, used against women, children and unarmed people, not for militaristic purposes, and something that must never happen again. This immediately framed Truman not as a purely strategic decision-maker, but as someone deeply aware of the moral consequences of nuclear warfare. The lecture emphasised that his primary association with the bomb after Hiroshima was one of deep moral abhorrence. What I found interesting here was the tension this creates. If Truman truly viewed the bomb in this way, it becomes difficult to see him simply as a leader who actively pursued nuclear warfare. Instead, he appears more conflicted, which challenges the usual narrative.
Was Truman Really Responsible?
A key part of the lecture focused on the common argument that Truman ordered the use of atomic bombs twice and later supported the development of the hydrogen bomb. These points are often used to portray him as the first Cold War president and a driving force behind nuclear escalation. However, the lecture complicated this view. It suggested that Truman wasn’t the one making the detailed decisions about the bomb. Instead, figures like Leslie Groves and Secretary of War Henry Stimson, along with committees such as the Target Committee, were responsible for the operational aspects. Truman’s role was described as largely non-interference, something even Groves himself characterised. This was surprising, as it suggests that the atomic bomb was less a personal decision and more the result of a system already in place. At the same time, I don’t think this completely removes Truman’s responsibility. Even if he wasn’t choosing targets or managing operations, he was still President. That means he ultimately allowed these decisions to go ahead, which keeps him central to the outcome.
Limited Knowledge and Reliance on Advisors
Another point that stood out was how little Truman initially knew about the atomic bomb. Before becoming president in 1945, his only exposure was a single 45-minute briefing on the Manhattan Project from Stimson and Groves. After this, most of the information he received was filtered through advisors, particularly Stimson, and focused more on diplomatic implications than operational details. This made me think about how decisions at the highest level are often shaped. Truman wasn’t necessarily making independent, fully informed decisions, but relying heavily on those around him. While this explains some of his actions, it also raises questions about whether such a lack of detailed understanding is itself a problem when dealing with something as significant as nuclear weapons.
The Kyoto Decision: A Key Moment
One of the most important examples of Truman’s direct involvement came with the decision over Kyoto. Initially, Kyoto had been selected as the primary target, but Stimson strongly opposed this. Despite attempts by Groves to restore Kyoto to the target list, Truman ultimately supported Stimson’s decision to remove it at Potsdam. This moment stood out because it showed that Truman was not completely passive. When he did intervene, his decision seemed to be influenced by broader cultural and moral concerns rather than purely military ones. It suggests a more selective form of leadership, where he chose carefully when to act.
Understanding the Use of the Bomb
The lecture also covered the timeline of events, including the Trinity test on 16 July and the use of “Fat Man” on 9 August. One particularly striking point was that Truman only fully realised Hiroshima was a city after the bombing, once the clouds cleared. If accurate, this suggests that his understanding of the bomb’s impact was initially quite abstract. There was also supposed to be a third bomb, but Truman ordered a halt to further atomic bombing due to moral concerns. This decision suggests that he did recognise a limit to the use of nuclear weapons. However, it also raises a difficult issue. While stopping further bombings shows restraint, it came only after significant destruction had already occurred. This makes his response feel more reactive than preventative.
Post-War Actions: Controlling the Atomic Age
What I found most convincing in the lecture was the focus on Truman’s actions after the war. Despite taking full responsibility for the bombings, he moved quickly to limit military control over nuclear weapons. In 1945, he withdrew support for the military’s Atomic Energy Act Bill and instead pushed for civilian control and strong presidential oversight. By 1947, when control of atomic weapons passed to the US Atomic Energy Commission, Truman refused to return them to the military. Compared to later presidents like Eisenhower, he allowed far less nuclear authority to be placed in military hands. This suggests that while Truman was involved in the introduction of nuclear weapons, he was also actively trying to prevent their normalisation.
Truman and the Cold War
Another interesting argument was that Truman was not initially strongly anti-Soviet. Up until around 1950, he appeared to support ideas of demilitarisation and cooperation. It was only with the outbreak of the Korean War that he began to consider nuclear buildup more seriously. This shows that his approach evolved over time, rather than being driven by a fixed Cold War mindset from the beginning.
Final Reflection
Overall, the lecture made me rethink Truman’s role quite significantly. He cannot be easily categorised as either a promoter of nuclear weapons or someone entirely opposed to them. Instead, he appears as a transitional figure, caught between the realities of war and the moral implications of a new and unprecedented weapon. While he bears ultimate responsibility as President, his limited involvement in operational decisions and his later efforts to control nuclear weapons suggest a far more complex legacy. What stood out most to me is that Truman’s significance lies not only in the use of the atomic bomb, but in how he responded to it afterwards. In many ways, his presidency marks the beginning of the struggle to control nuclear power — a struggle that still continues today.