The Quit India Campaign of 1942: Mass Protest, Repression, and the Meaning of Resistance

The Quit India Campaign of 1942: A Study of its Effectiveness

Source 1 would been extremely credible for a historian to investigate into to determine the effectiveness of the “Quit India” campaign because its inferencing towards Gandhi’s shift in perspective as well as poor planning directly shows how lack of responsibility led to the campaign being rendered ineffective. Morares recorded the dialogue Gandhi had spoken regarding violence seeping into the protest, claiming that “if, in spite of precautions, rioting does take place, it cannot be helped” which implies that Gandhi had abandoned the concept of satyagraha and was unafraid to let violence and rioting occur for the sake of the nation achieving purna swaraj, which proved the movement’s ineffectiveness due to the potential deterioration of Raj relationship, preventing better negotiation in the future. This is backed from my own knowledge that the main slogan Gandhi had come up with for the campaign was “Do or Die” which suggests that he no longer cares about how India achieves independence or what the consequences could have been, once again leading the movement as though it was going to succeed, where the overconfidence contributes to the campaign’s ineffectiveness. Furthermore, when describing the aftermath of the campaign, Morares decided to enunciate on the surprise Gandhi felt upon the time of the arrest, where “oddly enough, he had not expected the arrests so soon” which indicates that Gandhi had never considered himself responsible for whatever damage or destruction he would have brought as a result of the campaign, which only led to the campaign being dubbed ineffective due to this lack of responsibility. This is supported by the fact that the Quit India Movement had led to over 1,000 deaths and 3,000 serious injuries being recorded, which further emphasises the ineffectiveness of the campaign as Gandhi denies being the leading cause for this, refusing to accept he is in the wrong, his stubbornness leading to the arrest of multiple Congress leaders and himself. Finally, when Morares is signing off this extract, he mentions how “the rank and file of Congress were left to act on their own initiative and resources.” hinting at how the lack of central leadership led to the movement being claimed ineffective, further fuelling the lack of responsibility Gandhi took for the damage he brought. This is backed up by the fact that all members of Congress were arrested a day after the campaign and discussions were made to deport them to Uganda (and Gandhi to Yemen) suggesting that due to the British perceiving each Congress member to be responsible for the violence as well as Gandhi, the supposed main leader of the campaign, not necessarily claiming himself or Congress to be responsible for whatever happened only further convinces a historian that the campaign was ineffective due to there being no actual leader that led the Movement. The source’s provenance also makes it substantially historically valuable for a historian for this investigation. The source being an autobiography is highly useful because it suggests that more intimate details were shared for the reason of the movement’s ineffectiveness and Morares was a journalist, this implies that he had a first-hand witness of what exactly happened at the event, having even known Congress leaders himself stating he was in the very meeting they were in before thew campaign’s launch, therefore allowing his words and picturing of the scene to be more believable. However, a historian has to be cautious about the fact that as a journalist, he may have had slipped in his own political agenda and opinion into the text, which might not be representative of how others might have considered the movement and it was written in 1973, many years after the movement, so the recollection might have been hazier than perceived despite being written as a firsthand account.

On the other hand, Source 2 is also substantially useful for a historian to gain insight into the investigation regarding the effectiveness of the Quit India Campaign because its powerful language and absolute condemnation of Gandhi suggested that uncontrolled violence led to the campaign’s label of ineffectiveness. As the Viceroy was writing his letter to Gandhi, he wrote about how he was “very glad to read [Gandhi’s] absolute condemnation of violence” which is supposedly in a sarcastic and unimpressed tone where such implies that Gandhi’s decision to remove himself from the very thing he was known for led to crowds gaining greater freedom to unleash suppressed anger, suggesting how the uncontrolled nature of the public was as a result of Gandhi’s shift in attitude, leading to the movement being branded ineffective. To support this, Indians during the uncontrolled rioting mainly targeted European citizens and when not attacking them, were blurting out “Quit India” to their faces, suggesting that Gandhi’s “Do or Die” mantra had completely been normalised into public society, encouraging violence to a greater degree where such led to the movement being ineffective. Furthermore, the Viceroy is very quick to point out that Gandhi’s excuse for the violence being that the public fell short of his ideal view was “no answer those who have lost their property or suffered severe injuries…” which implied that the violence had only done harm to the Indian population as such would have made them appear to be barbaric, the very thing they didn’t want to be seen as, suggesting how the backfire made the movement ineffective. This is supported by the fact that only 216 soldiers in the Indian regiments gone absent without leave and the military remained loyal to the Raj, suggesting that the unchecked rage only resulted in the British labelling Indians as undeserving of any future beneficial negotiation in the future due to their aggressive nature, which mad the Raj look more civilised rendering the movement ineffective. Finally, the Viceroy clearly stated that “the whole blame should be laid at the door of the Government of India” isn’t an acceptable excuse, inferencing that direct manipulation the Raj used to twist the narrative directly led to the campaign being known as ineffective since they choose to understand the campaign being entirely India’s fault as they had done nothing to instigate it. From my own knowledge, when coming to release a statement about the movement, Raj propaganda had duped Congress as a collective whole being responsible for the violence with Gandhi in particular as a prominent figurehead, suggesting that the holistic perspectives the British adopted and used to twist the perspectives of many others on the event had made many others view it as ineffective. Another thing which gives this source immense historical value is its provenance. This source was written by the Viceroy at the time, Linlithgow, which is useful as it allowed us to gain an insight on the British perspective on the movement and the source being a letter released to the public also makes it highly useful as it gives a greater insight into the intentions of the Viceroy presenting himself as a powerful and decisive figure and Gandhi nothing more than a barbaric to brainwash the public and how such would have contributed to the movement being made ineffective. However, a historian must be cautious when using this source because as this source was a public source, many people would have read it across India and the Viceroy might have made it more surface level than it could have been and could have given weight onto the agenda of governance presentation more, where certain details may have been hidden or even possibly omitted.

When taken into account together, both Sources 1 and 2 are extremely useful for a historian to investigate into the effectiveness of the “Quit India” campaign because whilst both sources had the same message regarding the movement to be ineffective overall, they provided different reasons as to why the movement was duped ineffective. Source 1 had stated the main reason was due to poor planning and Gandhi’s lack of responsibility and Source 2 on the other hand, stated it was due to public uncontrolled violence. Furthermore, whilst Source 1 by itself only the Indian perspective and Source 2 the British perspective, it gives a further reason as to why a historian would attribute weight to both sources together as they provide a balanced, nuanced view from both sides regarding the Quit India campaign together. But once again, there are limitations which the historian must be cautious about when investigating and interrogating these sources. For example, although Source 1 was written by a journalist, someone who has to only present the facts whilst remaining impartial, there have been moments where over-emotion could present over-exaggeration and fall into speculation, causing credibility to be slightly debased, for example, “his biggest mistake.” It could also be argued that the journalist might have implicitly left his political opinion within the source but such would be a weak argument considering there is no definitive proof within the text of such happening. Furthermore, although the source is an autobiography, meaning it provides a first-hand witness of the movement and discussion with Congress of which the journalist knew its members well, it was written in 1973, many years after the movement, which means the recollection of the event was hazy. Furthermore, Source 2 was a letter written by the Viceroy to Gandhi, which gives the historian insight into the ideological clash and the unfiltered British perspective of the movement, the letter’s contents were intended to be released to the public, so they moreso functioned as propaganda. Furthermore, the source, the source was written whilst Gandhi was imprisoned in Aga Khan Palace, which shows a direct imbalance of power as the Viceroy essentially holds the judgement of life or death over the one whom he is suppressing. Another aspect of both of the sources that makes it useful is in their differing tone and use of emotive language, how such contrasts reflect the same message. On the one hand, Source 1 as a (meant to be) impartial source has a relatively descriptive tone that seems condescending at some points which infers the campaign’s ineffectiveness through the disappointment that unlike some of Gandhi’s more influential campaigns like that of the Salt March, it was seen to be more of a failure. On the other hand, Source 2 as a letter written by the Viceroy utilises emotion to the highest degree, more clearly anger and frustration with slight hints of sarcasm (“I am very glad to read your absolute condemnation of violence”) which shows how the campaign was ineffective due to how the damage that Gandhi and the public had caused was irreversible and unaccounted for, not making up for the harm he brought and showing the Indians to be uncivilised.

In conclusion, both Sources 1 and 2 are incredibly useful for a historian to investigate the effectiveness of the Quit India Campaign as each of them proved that the campaign had significantly backfired for different reasons. Gandhi’s lack of responsibility and the public outrage were mainly seen as the reasons when both sources are considered. They differ in the ways in which they use emotions and tones, yet both ultimately remained primary sources, sources in which insights could be made with first-hand perspectives in mind. Even if ideal presentation and hazier recollection were evident limitations within the sources, they ultimately still gave the broader picture of perspective in regard to how everyone, Indian or British, had seen the Quit India Campaign as ineffective overall.